Inequality and Growth: The Role of Beliefs and Culture by Strieborny Martin
Inequality and Growth: The Role of Beliefs and
Culture￿
Martin Striebornyy
First Draft: April, 2008
This Draft: November 9, 2010
Abstract
In egalitarian countries people believe that luck rather than hard work
determines success in life and expect their government to provide both eco-
nomic growth and social equity. This leads to a stronger dynamic interplay
between government interventions, inequality and growth within such coun-
tries. The presented results thus con￿rm the importance of cultural factors
and economic beliefs in shaping the inequality-growth link. More funda-
mentally, the paper demonstrates that cultural background does not only
in￿ uence the long-run economic outcomes, but can also a⁄ect the joint dy-
namics of real economic variables within countries over time.
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11 Introduction
The question whether inequality promotes or hinders economic growth is among
the most controversial ones in the whole ￿eld of growth and development. In the
last 15 years there has been a growing literature on the subject making use of ever
more advanced econometric techniques, but a clear answer seems still out of reach.
This paper departs from this body of literature and stresses the role of beliefs and
cultural factors in the inequality-growth nexus. Standard political economy models
assume that high inequality induces the median voter to support a distortionary
redistribution with adverse consequences for growth. This mechanism is supposed
to operate in the same way within all countries from Scandinavia to the United
States. I examine whether the joint dynamics of inequality, redistribution and
growth within countries di⁄er because of their di⁄erent cultural background.
This paper claims that governments are altering the level of state interventions
in order to provide both economic growth and social equity demanded by voters
at a given point in time. In some periods public focus is on economic growth
and hence policy leads to increases in both growth and inequality. In other peri-
ods equality considerations dominate the political debate, the resulting surge in
regulation and redistribution leads to a decrease in inequality and worsening of
the economic performance. Such mechanism generates a positive co-movement
between inequality and growth within countries over time.
The main point of this study is that the cultural background of countries af-
fects the intensity of the pattern outlined above. The idea of altering the scope of
government in order to regulate the level of inequality tends to prevail in (egalitar-
ian) countries that for cultural reasons consider inequality unfair. On the contrary,
public support for such ￿ne-tuning will be rather limited in the (laissez-faire) coun-
tries where the electorate views a› uence as a deserved outcome of hard work. As
a result, one would expect stronger positive co-movement of inequality and growth
over time in culturally egalitarian countries.
To formalize this theory, I use the theoretical framework set out in Alesina and
Angeletos (2005). This seminal work shows how the demand for fairness generates
complementarity between beliefs and politico-economic outcomes. Such comple-
mentarity can then lead to multiple steady states. On the one hand, the US steady
state (laissez-faire countries in the terminology of this paper) is characterized by
less redistribution and widespread belief that success in life is the result of hard
work. On the other hand, agents operating in the EU steady state (i.e. the pop-
ulation of egalitarian countries) believe that luck determines success in life and
therefore support a bigger economic role for the government. The speci￿c histor-
ical experience, in the form of di⁄erent initial conditions or of di⁄erent shocks,
determines in which of the two steady states the country ends up.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) focus on the steady state properties of the two
2equilibria. I am interested in the economic implications of shocks to fairness pref-
erence in the egalitarian versus the laissez-faire regime. I show that in egalitarian
countries an increased preference for fairness translates into higher level of redis-
tribution. In the laissez-faire countries the e⁄ect of such preference shock on the
redistribution level displays in general a smaller magnitude and has an ambiguous
sign. The intuition for this result is simple. In countries where people believe
in the injustice of inequality, increased preference for fairness transmits directly
into higher demand for redistribution. The same preference shift produces smaller
increases or even decreases of government interference in the laissez-faire regime,
in which social beliefs equate redistribution to the expropriation of hard-working
rich people.
In the empirical part of the paper I employ the question from the World Value
Survey asking the respondents whether success in life depends more on hard work
or on luck and connections. One would expect that public demand for egalitarian
outcomes is higher in countries where successful people are considered to be rather
lucky than hard-working. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) - building on previous
work by Alesina et al. (2001) - provide some cross-sectional empirical evidence for
this conjecture. Both papers use the same WVS question and show that a stronger
belief in luck as main determinant of success is associated with a higher share of
social spending in GDP. In this paper I utilize this social belief to empirically
test whether the within dynamics of state intrusion, inequality and growth di⁄er
between egalitarian and laissez-faire countries. I do so in three steps.
First, I tackle the endogeneity issue concerning such surveys. The expressed
beliefs re￿ ect both the deep cultural attitudes and the feedbacks from the real
economy. I use the shares of various religious denominations in the population as
instrumental variables for the average survey response in a given country. Religious
composition serves here as a proxy for a broader notion of cultural di⁄erences
across countries. Thus, the instrumented value of the survey response represents
the culturally determined component of people￿ s attitudes toward social equity. I
use this value to divide the countries into egalitarian and laissez-faire societies.
Second, I present some evidence for the described mechanism involving the
joint development of three economic variables over time. The changes in inequal-
ity and government interventions over time are negatively correlated both within
laissez-faire and egalitarian countries. The correlation is however stronger in the
egalitarian group. The di⁄erence between mean correlations of the two country
groups is both quantitatively important and statistically signi￿cant (3% level). The
within correlation of changes in government interventions and economic growth is
not signi￿cant for laissez-faire countries, but negative for egalitarian ones.
Finally, I test whether the cultural background matters in the reduced form
dynamics of inequality and growth over time. I ￿nd that these two variables
3exhibit stronger positive co-movement within egalitarian countries than within the
laissez-faire ones. Various panel data estimation techniques capturing the within
dynamics over time (￿xed e⁄ects, system GMM and bias-corrected Least-Square
Dummy Variable) con￿rm that the coe¢ cient of inequality in the growth regression
is signi￿cantly higher in egalitarian countries.
These results contribute to two strands of the literature.
First, the results indicate that culture might play an important role in the com-
plex relationship between inequality and growth. This contributes to the empirical
work that tries to identify the causal e⁄ects of income distribution on economic
performance. The renewed interest in this question started with the seminal con-
tributions of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) who
provided empirical evidence for a negative e⁄ect. The subsequent cross-sectional
studies con￿rmed this result, but the later use of panel data estimation challenged
the emerging consensus. Both Li and Zou (1998) applying ￿xed e⁄ects estimation
and Forbes (2000) using di⁄erence GMM approach found a positive and signi￿-
cant relationship between inequality and growth in the short and medium term.1
Empirical evidence has remained inconclusive since. Estimations relying on cross-
section estimations mostly ￿nd negative coe¢ cient estimates, while methods fo-
cusing on the time-series component of variations (￿xed e⁄ects, GMM estimation)
tend to report a positive link. The longer the chosen growth period, the lower
the coe¢ cient of the inequality measure in the growth regression.2 Given this
diverse and sometimes contradictory evidence, subsequent papers applied various
and increasingly advanced econometric techniques and tried to identify the possible
non-linearities in the inequality-growth nexus. Barro (2000) uses random e⁄ects
and 3SLS estimator and argues that the link is positive for rich countries and
negative for poor ones. Banerjee and Du￿ o (2003) employ kernel estimation and
suggest that both positive and negative changes in inequality are associated with
lower economic growth. Voitchovsky (2005) applies the system GMM estimator
and ￿nds evidence for a positive (negative) e⁄ect of inequality at the top (bot-
tom) end of the income distribution. This paper o⁄ers a fundamentally di⁄erent
explanation relying on deep cultural characteristics of countries. The presented
results indicate that cultural factors could be an important driving force behind
the observed evolution of inequality and growth. To my knowledge such possibility
has not been examined so far.
Second, the paper contributes to the emerging ￿eld of cultural economics. The
idea that culture matters for economic outcomes has attracted a lot of attention
in recent years. The interested reader can turn to Tabellini (2007) and Fernan-
1Even if this is not necessarily at odds with the cross-sectional evidence of a negative link in
the long run. For details see Forbes (2000).
2For an overview of this growing literature see e.g. de Dominicis, de Groot and Florax (2006).
4dez (2007) for an excellent analysis of the current state and future perspectives
in this promising research program. So far empirical work in this area focused
on cross-sectional variation across countries or regions. In this literature the eco-
nomic signi￿cance of cultural factors shows up in the di⁄erent long-run economic
outcomes across culturally diverse geographical units. This paper raises the possi-
bility that the cultural background can also a⁄ect the joint evolution of economic
variables within countries over time. This result might be seen as a complement
to the existing evidence on the link between culture and long-term economic out-
comes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section intro-
duces a straightforward extension into the model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005)
and shows how variation in the strength of preference for fairness can generate the
patterns outlined above. Sections 3, 4 and 5 constitute the empirical part of the
paper. Section 3 lays out the instrumentation strategy and econometric method-
ology. Section 4 presents the data and section 5 the empirical results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
This section introduces an exogenous shock to the preference for fairness into the
theoretical model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005). This allows examining the
impact of prevailing beliefs on the joint dynamics of government interventions,
inequality and economic growth within countries. I show that in egalitarian coun-
tries an increase in fairness preference generates an increase in the redistribution
level. In laissez-faire countries the same preference shock has qualitatively am-
biguous and quantitatively smaller impact on the level of redistribution. In the
model, more redistribution leads in turn to a lower inequality and slower eco-
nomic growth. The presence of shocks to preference for fairness will thus produce
a stronger positive co-movement of inequality and growth within the egalitarian
countries compared to the laissez-faire ones.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) study a non-overlapping-generations model. Each
generation consists of a continuum of agents indexed by i 2 [0;1], who live for one
period. The pre-tax wealth of agent from dynasty i and generation t is given by:
yit = Aiteit + ￿it + kit￿1 (1)
where Ait denotes innate talent, eit e⁄ort, ￿it luck and kit￿1 the bequest (or more
generally parental investment) of the previous generation. The agent￿ s budget
constraint writes:
5cit + kit = wit ￿ (1 ￿ ￿t)yit + Gt (2)




where cit denotes consumption, kit bequest left to the next generation, wit is the
disposable wealth, ￿t is the tax rate, Gt lump-sum transfer and yt represents the
mean income in generation t. Individual preferences re￿ ect both sel￿sh motives
and an altruistic desire for a fair social outcome:
Uit = uit ￿ ￿￿t (3)
with uit denoting the private utility derived from own consumption cit, parental
investment kit and e⁄ort eit. In particular:









where ￿it captures the willingness to work and the constant 1
(1￿￿)1￿￿￿￿ is just
a convenient normalization. Besides their private utility, agents also exhibit a




(uit ￿ b uit)
2 (4)
where uit denotes the actual level of utility and b uit the fair level of utility. The
latter is de￿ned as the utility achieved by the dynasty due to talent and e⁄ort and
not luck or government transfers. In particular:
b uit = Vit(b cit;b kit;eit)
where b cit and b kit denote the fair (luck-free) levels of consumption and parental
investment de￿ned below.
Heterogeneity in the population is thus characterized by the distribution of
(Ait;￿it;￿it). For simpli￿cation let us de￿ne ￿it ￿ (Ait)2￿it, ￿2
￿ ￿ V ar(￿i), ￿2
￿ ￿
V ar(￿i) and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿m with ￿ and ￿m denoting the mean and median of ￿i,
respectively. Parameters ￿it and ￿it are i.i.d. across agents but fully persistent over
time. Further assumptions include Cov(￿i;￿i) = 0, and zero mean and median for
￿it. The economy is thus parametrized by E ￿ (￿;￿;￿;￿2
￿;￿2
￿). The parameters ￿
and ￿ capture the two sources of support for redistribution: the traditional sel￿sh
motive arising if the median voter is poorer than the average (￿ > 0) and the
altruistic motive originating in the desire for fair social outcomes (￿ > 0).
6The optimizing agents choose consumption, e⁄ort and parental investment
(cit;eit;kit) to maximize the utility subject to their individual budget constraint
while taking the aggregate outcomes (￿t;￿t;Gt) as given. Due to the Cobb-Douglas
functional form of private utility, the resulting optimal levels of consumption and
parental investment become
cit = (1 ￿ ￿)wit and kit = ￿wit
Accordingly, the utility of household i in generation t amounts to uit = wit ￿
1
2￿it(eit)2 implying the following optimal level of e⁄ort:
eit = (1 ￿ ￿t)Ait￿it
Given these outcomes of individual optimization, one can de￿ne the fair levels
of consumption and parental investment. Intuitively, those are the levels that
would be achieved in the absence of pure luck ￿it and social transfers. Formally:
b cit = (1 ￿ ￿)b yit and b kit = ￿b yit
b wit = b yit = Aiteit + b kit￿1
Iterating the latter expression backwards yields the fair level of wealth, which
re￿ ects the cumulative e⁄ect of talent Ait and e⁄ort eit over the whole history of
dynasty i:









Analogously, the di⁄erence between actual and fair wealth wit ￿ b wit represents
the overall e⁄ect of luck and redistribution on the wealth accumulated by the
dynasty. Furthermore, because of quasi-linearity of private utility in wealth, uit ￿
b uit = wit ￿ b wit for every i, which implies that aggregate social injustice ￿t = R
i(uit ￿ b uit)2 reduces to:
￿t = V ar(wit ￿ b wit)
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show in the technical appendix to their paper
that for a given stationary history of taxation (￿s = ￿ for all previous generations
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7and the overall level of social injustice is:
￿t = [(1￿￿t)￿t￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2















Under the assumption that the government chooses the tax rate ￿t in order to
maximize the welfare of the median agent, the optimal tax rate for the current
generation is then ￿0 = ￿(￿;E) with
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1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
> 0 and B =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
> 0
The optimal tax rate is thus increasing in the di⁄erence between the average
and the median agent (￿), re￿ ecting the standard sel￿sh motive for redistribution.3
If the preference for fairness is present (￿ > 0), the optimal tax rate depends also
on the sources of income inequality (￿2
￿ versus ￿2
￿). Alesina and Angeletos focus on
the fact that multiple steady states emerge in an environment with preference for
fairness. The US steady state is characterized by lower taxation, less distortions
(and thus higher output), higher inequality and fairer outcomes as captured by the
ratio
V ar(b yit)
V ar(yit￿b yit) than the EU steady state. Throughout their analysis the authors
hold all the parameters including the strength of fairness preference (￿) constant.
For the purpose of this paper, I am rather interested in how a small change in
preference for fairness a⁄ects the level of redistribution in countries with di⁄erent
levels of (observed) social injustice.4 My argument is the following. Parameter
￿ is supposed to capture a deep human need for fairness. However, people are
more sel￿sh in some periods and less in others. To use an extreme example, a
natural disaster can bring the best (or worst) in the population of a country. At
the same time, there is little reason to think that people in some countries are
intrinsically more sel￿sh than in others. I therefore assume that ￿ does not vary
3Note that both mean and median of luck ￿ equal zero, so that the di⁄erence between
average and median voter originates solely in the heterogeneity of skills and work ethos captured
by ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿m.
4In the model agents can perfectly observe the aggregate outcomes including the level of
social injustice ￿. Thus, for the purposes of this section observed values of ￿, ￿2
￿, ￿2
￿ etc. equal
their true values. The empirical part of the paper relaxes this assumption.
8across countries, but is not perfectly stable over time. Technically, I introduce an
exogenous shock to ￿ which occurs in the steady state.
Redistribution is supposed to bring about more fairness in a society. A change
in preference for fairness will therefore have an e⁄ect on the redistribution level
demanded by the median agent. Crucially, this e⁄ect will depend on how unfair
she perceives the existing inequality in society to be in the ￿rst place. On the
one side, the inequality originating in the heterogeneity of skills (Ai) and work
ethos (￿i) - as captured by (￿2
￿) - is considered to be fair. On the other side,
the inequality generated by di⁄erent luck of agents - captured by (￿2
￿) - is seen as
undeserved. Thus, the question is whether the relative importance of pure luck
(￿2
￿) versus skills and work ethos (￿2
￿) matters for the sign and magnitude of the
derivative @￿t
@￿ .
The benevolent government chooses the optimal current tax ￿t taking the his-
tory of taxation ￿ as given. Computing the ￿rst order condition from (6) then
yields:
0 = ￿t ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿t) + B]￿ + ￿t￿
+2￿[(1 ￿ ￿t)(￿t ￿ B) + A][1 ￿ 2￿t + B]￿
2
￿




The application of the implicit function theorem allows then to express the
e⁄ect of a small change in the preference for fairness (￿) on the optimal level of
redistribution. To make the point clear, I focus on the extreme cases, i.e. when
observed inequality arises only due to heterogeneity of luck (￿2
￿ = 0) or originates
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9In this paper￿ s terminology, the ￿rst case describes egalitarian countries and the
second relates to the laissez-faire ones. The expressions are rather complicated,
but one can identify several patterns. If the inequality is due to pure luck, an
increase in the preference for fairness leads unambiguously to higher redistribution.
If di⁄erent skills and work ethos are the sources of di⁄erent income, then the
sign of @￿t
@￿ is ambiguous. Another matter of interest concerns the magnitude
of the e⁄ect. One additional assumption is needed for a meaningful analysis of
this issue. The preference for fairness (￿) has to be relatively small compared to
the sel￿sh motive for redistribution captured by 1
2 + ￿. This assures that the
denominator in (8) remains positive and does not get close to zero. Without this
additional assumption, a small change in the parameters could lead to switching
of @￿t
@￿ between zero, in￿nity and minus in￿nity.6
Even if the denominator in (8) is positive, the sign of the numerator and hence
of the whole expression remains ambiguous. Numerical simulations show that a
lower level of redistribution and a higher share of wealth allocated to parental
investment (￿), are associated with a negative @￿t
@￿ in laissez-faire countries where
luck does not a⁄ect the income distribution (￿2
￿ = 0). Additionally, the absolute
magnitude of @￿t
@￿ is smaller in the laissez-faire countries. This holds true when
parameters other than ￿2
￿ and ￿2
￿ are equal for both countries￿groups and also if
one allows for reasonably higher level of redistribution in the egalitarian countries.
A preference shock has thus in general a smaller impact on redistribution in
countries where agents observe fair origins of inequality. The intuition is the follow-
ing. If the inequality arises from pure luck, the median voter desires redistribution
in order to correct this outcome. The increase in preference for fairness (positive
shock to ￿) then unambiguously leads to a surge in the demand for redistribution.
If the inequality originates in di⁄ering skills and work ethos, the median voter
faces a trade-o⁄ between her sel￿sh interest (￿) and her desire for social justice
(￿). Redistribution increases her private utility by transferring wealth from the
average agent. At the same time, such redistribution expropriates hard working
agents with better skills and hence makes the income distribution less fair. An
increase in ￿ while holding ￿ constant would then generate a decline in the re-
distribution implemented by a government maximizing the welfare of the median
voter.
However, the accumulated wealth of dynasties re￿ ects also redistributions that
6To stress the point, let assume that the median voter does not care about his private utility
at all, so that the ￿rst line in (6) would be equal to zero. Then the choice of the optimal tax rate
would be driven entirely by fairness considerations captured by the parameter ￿. Small changes
in the preference for fairness could then easily translate into immense changes of the tax rate set
by the government. The presence of su¢ ciently strong sel￿sh motivation thus prevents the tax
rate from being implausibly sensitive to small variations in the preference for fairness.
10occurred in the past (￿). The undeserved component of current wealth due to
those past redistributions rationalizes further redistribution after increase in fair-
ness preference ￿. This o⁄setting e⁄ect explains why in laissez-faire countries with
no luck heterogeneity the derivative @￿t
@￿ has an ambiguous sign and a smaller mag-
nitude than in the countries characterized by inequality due to luck. In egalitarian
countries the absence of "fair heterogeneity" (￿2
￿ = 0) and the history of past
redistribution go in the same direction, yielding an unambiguously positive and
relatively large value of @￿t
@￿ .
To sum up, introducing an exogenous shock to preference for fairness (￿) into
the theoretical framework of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) has di⁄erent implica-
tions in the laissez-faire and egalitarian regimes. In egalitarian countries a positive
(negative) shock to fairness preference leads to an unambiguous increase (decrease)
in the redistribution level. In the case of the laissez-faire countries the sign of the
e⁄ect is ambiguous and its absolute magnitude is smaller. Thus, in the egalitar-
ian countries the changes in the level of government interventions will be to a
larger extent driven by shifts in the public focus between fairness and economic
performance compared to the laissez-faire countries.
In the model positive (negative) changes in the redistribution level lead in turn
to a decrease (increase) of both inequality and economic growth (see Appendix
A). Empirically, one should then observe within egalitarian countries a stronger
negative co-movement of redistribution and inequality as well as a stronger neg-
ative co-movement of redistribution and growth. This would imply a stronger
positive co-movement of inequality and growth in those countries. Situation will
be di⁄erent in countries where people see income inequality as consequence of
di⁄erent skills and work ethos. There the dynamics of government interventions
will be dominated by the allocative and stabilization role of state rather than eq-
uity considerations. Consequently, the described pattern of co-movements between
government interventions, inequality and growth will be less pronounced in such
laissez-faire countries.
3 Econometric Methodology and Instrumenta-
tion Strategy
The main point of the paper is to ask whether cultural background a⁄ects the
inequality-growth dynamics within countries. It is therefore natural to use panel
data techniques that control for country ￿xed e⁄ects. There are at least two
other reasons to focus on within-country estimation techniques. First, the bulk of
recent empirical growth literature seems to agree, that controlling for the omit-
ted country-speci￿c e⁄ects is crucial in the context of growth econometrics. The
11majority of panel data growth studies therefore rely on within-group estimation
rather than on random e⁄ects estimation (Durlauf et al. 2005, p. 629). This
applies to the studies looking at the e⁄ects of inequality on economic growth as
well. Second, since Forbes (2000) most of the controversy in the literature on the
growth-inequality nexus is associated with ￿xed e⁄ects panel data studies.
The empirical model in the paper is represented by the following dynamic
speci￿cation that controls for ￿xed e⁄ects and has become standard in recent
growth literature:
yit = ￿yit￿1 + ￿Xit + ni + ht + vit (9)
where y represents the level of output, X is a vector of regressors, ht are the
time dummies, ni capture the unobserved country-speci￿c e⁄ects and vit is the
error term. The length of the time period in the panel data structure is ￿ve years,
as usual in the literature. This relatively low frequency should eliminate short-
run business ￿ uctuations and is also motivated by data availability. In order to
examine the interactions between cultural background of a country and its internal
growth-inequality dynamics, one has to narrow down the general formulation in
(9).
In particular, the performed regressions will rely on the following speci￿cation:
yit = ￿yit￿1 + ￿1Inequalityit + ￿2Inequalityit ￿ Culturei +
+￿3Investmentit + ￿4Educationit + ni + ht + vit (10)
where Culture is the dummy variable which takes value 1 for egalitarian coun-
tries and value zero for laissez-faire countries.7 The variable of main interest is the
interaction term between this dummy variable and the time varying measure of
inequality. A signi￿cant coe¢ cient ￿2 would imply that the cultural character of
a country a⁄ects its internal growth-inequality dynamics.8 The control variables
take into account the importance of physical and human capital accumulation for
economic growth. I rely on the standard proxies used in the empirical growth
literature. Investmentit is the share of investment on GDP and Educationit rep-
resents the average number of years of secondary schooling in country i at time
t.
The crucial task is to correctly identify the relevant cultural background of
countries, in order to meaningfully divide them into egalitarian and laissez-faire
7As a robustness check I also use a continuous culture variable that captures the relative
strength of egalitarian versus laissez-faire cultural background.
8The cultural background of a country is assumed to be invariant over time. The direct e⁄ect
of culture on growth will thus by captured by the ￿xed e⁄ects ni.
12ones. In the theoretical framework of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) agents perfectly
observe the relative contribution of luck to the income heterogeneity. This full
information about the aggregate level of social injustice is surely a simpli￿cation,
as the authors themselves readily admit (Alesina and Angeletos 2005, p. 974f).
The public perceptions of reality often di⁄er from the reality itself. And these
perceptions, rather than the truth, are decisive from the political-economy point
of view. It does not matter whether rich people are hard-working agents who
do not owe a single cent of their wealth to the pure luck (￿2
￿ = 0). As long
as the public believes that the inequality in their country has nothing to do with
di⁄erences in e⁄ort or skills (￿2
￿ = 0), it will expect from government both economic
growth and social equity. The best empirical proxy for an egalitarian country in
this framework is thus not the true (and mostly unobservable) dominance of luck
over hard work in generating inequality, but the public belief that such dominance
prevails. Critically, such beliefs are to large extent determined by the cultural
background and historical experience of a given country.
In my line of argument a deeply rooted cultural background shapes long-
standing popular beliefs that in turn determine the egalitarian or laissez-faire
character of a country. The standard proxies for public beliefs come from rep-
resentative surveys. A problem is that the answers in such surveys re￿ ect not only
deep cultural attitudes of the respondents but also feedback from the real econ-
omy. Religion is a natural choice if one wants to identify the part of beliefs that is
culturally determined and therefore exogenous to the contemporaneous economic
situation in the country. Previous work (Guiso et al. 2003, 2006) already es-
tablished a signi￿cant link between religion and economic beliefs at the individual
level. The focus here is on the relationship at the aggregate level: how the cultural
environment shapes economic beliefs of a representative agent in a given country.
I therefore look at the religious composition of the population, which stands for
a broader notion of countries￿cultural background. In particular, I employ the
shares of various religious denominations in the population as instrumental vari-
ables for the average survey response in a given country. This corresponds to
running the following cross-sectional regression:
Beliefsi = ￿ + ￿ReligionSharesi + ui (11)
The instrumented value of the survey response ( d Beliefsi = b ￿+b ￿ReligionSharesi)
thus represents the culturally determined component of people￿ s beliefs about mag-
nitude of unfair income heterogeneity in a given country. I use this value to divide
the countries into equally large groups of egalitarian and laissez-faire societies.
Crucially, this division occurs after instrumenting the beliefs by the religious com-
position. This approach enables to distinguish between societies whose cultural
background favours rather laissez-faire attitudes and societies that culturally tend
13to more egalitarian views. The econometric speci￿cation in (10) enables then to
examine whether the relationship between inequality and growth di⁄ers across
these two groups of countries. Given the two-step procedure (variable d Beliefsi is
estimated from (11) rather than observed) I will rely on bootstrapped standard
errors when estimating regression (10).
The choice of an appropriate estimation technique plays an important role in
this econometric framework. The speci￿cation in (10) controls for country ￿xed
e⁄ects. The OLS estimation will therefore not su⁄er from the bias caused by the
presence of non-observable country speci￿c factors that can be correlated with
included regressors.
However, the standard ￿xed e⁄ects estimation takes into account neither the
presence of lagged dependent variable in the dynamic speci￿cation nor the poten-
tial endogeneity of other explanatory variables. To take care of these two problems
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed an estimator, now known as the di⁄erence
GMM estimator. This panel data estimator takes the ￿rst-di⁄erence of (10) and
then uses lagged values in levels of variables as instruments. The estimator is
consistent if the instruments are valid and the residuals in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced
equation display no second-order serial correlation.9 The advantage of the GMM
framework is the possibility for testing the validity of those assumptions. The
standard tools for this are the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and the
Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation. The di⁄erence GMM estimation was
￿rst applied to examine the inequality-growth link by Forbes (2000).
There are two potential problems with the use of the original di⁄erence GMM
estimation - over￿tting and weak instruments. The ￿rst problem can occur when
the researcher uses all available lagged value as instrumental variables, as was
done by Forbes (2000). In this case the number of instruments gets easily too
large relative to the size of the cross-section, which results in a ￿nite sample bias.
A natural remedy is to reduce the number of instruments by using fewer lags
than available. The second problem is more fundamental. When time series are
persistent, the lagged levels of variables will represent only weak instruments for
the ￿rst di⁄erences. This leads to both ￿nite sample bias and weak identi￿cation
when using the di⁄erence GMM estimation.10 As pointed out by Bond et al.
(2001), it is a quite realistic scenario in the context of growth empirics. In practice,
both problems can be detected by looking at the estimated coe¢ cient on the
lagged dependent variable. In this case, over￿tting and weak instruments lead
to a downward ￿nite sample bias. The within-estimation su⁄ers from the same
problem. So if the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable estimated by GMM
9On the other hand, the ￿rst-order serial correlation is expected to be negative. For details
see Bond (2002) and Bond et al (2001).
10For a more detailed treatment of this issue see e.g. Bond (2002).
14is close to or even below the value obtained by within estimation, one has to assume
the presence of over￿tting and/or weak instruments. Additionally, the p-value for
the Sargan test close to one also signals the presence of over￿tting.
The system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998) deals with the problem of weak instruments. In case of highly
persistent series this estimator has superior ￿nite sample properties and achieves
better identi￿cation than the di⁄erence GMM estimator.11 Intuitively, the sys-
tem GMM estimator does not rely exclusively on the ￿rst-di⁄erenced equations,
but exploits also information contained in the original equations in levels.12 This
proves to be helpful especially in case of highly persistent series typical for the
variables used in the growth regressions. In the context of inequality and growth,
the system GMM estimation was used e.g. by Voitchovsky (2005).
The dynamic GMM estimators used here are asymptotically consistent, but
have a relatively large variance in ￿nite samples compared with the standard
Least-Squares Dummy Variables (￿xed-e⁄ects) estimator. Kiviet (1995) developed
a bias-corrected Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDVC) estimator which takes
this trade-o⁄ between consistency and e¢ ciency into account. Using Monte Carlo
simulations, Kiviet (1995) shows that in ￿nite samples LSDVC estimator often out-
performs GMM estimation techniques. The advantages of LSDVC estimator are
especially pronounced in cross-country dynamic panels like the one in this paper.
The dynamic GMM methods were namely ￿rst developed for microeconomic panel
data with short time (T) and large cross-sectional (N) dimension and their desir-
able asymptotic properties are derived when N ! 1. Judson and Owen (1999)
document that for a standard macroeconomic panel with a small cross-sectional
dimension, LSDVC estimator routinely outperforms the GMM estimators.13 In
this paper I rely on the improved version of LSDVC estimator developed by Bruno
(2005) which is applicable also to unbalanced panels. To document the robustness
of the results and for better comparison with existing inequality-growth literature,
I employ also standard ￿xed-e⁄ects and system GMM estimation techniques.
11For details see Bond (2002), Bond et al. (2001) and the references cited there.
12Formally, the system GMM estimator imposes a stationarity restriction on the initial con-
ditions. This assumption yields additional moment conditions, which enable to use lagged ￿rst-
di⁄erences as valid instruments for the level equations. For details see Bond (2002) and Bond et
al. (2001).
13Judson and Owen (1999) use in their simulations N=20 or N=100 and T=5, T=10, T=20
or T=30. This corresponds to a standard macroeconomic dynamic panel like the one used in
this paper.
154 Data
Given the focus of the paper, it is essential to ￿nd a suitable proxy for perceived
unfairness of income heterogeneity across countries. I use the data from the World
Value Survey (WVS), which represents probably the most comprehensive database
of social and economic beliefs. The WVS has recently become a widely used source
in recent empirical literature on the role of beliefs for economic outcomes (Alesina
et al. 2001, Guiso et al. 2003). I have chosen to focus on the question about the
main determinant of success in life. In a representative opinion poll the respondents
in each country were confronted with two con￿ icting statements: "In the long run,
hard work usually brings a better life" and "Hard work doesn￿ t generally bring
success - it￿ s more a matter of luck and connections". They could choose 1 (means
complete agreement with ￿rst statement), 10 (complete agreement with second
statement) or any number in between. In terms of the theoretical motivation a high
value for the average response in a country implies a large (perceived) contribution





The answer to the above question seems determined mostly by deeper cultural
convictions. Yet it still provides a good proxy for the public beliefs regarding the
fairness of income di⁄erences. The more widespread is the belief that economic
success originates in luck rather than in hard work, the more public support for a
governmental provision of social equity can be expected.
The choice of a proper proxy for economic beliefs is not innocuous, especially
if some authors work with questions comparing the actual and the desirable state
of a⁄airs. One example is the question from WVS asking the respondents whether
incomes should be made more equal or the country needs larger income di⁄erences
as incentives. The response yields arguably a better proxy for the attitudes toward
redistributive role of the state and was used e.g. by Guiso et al. (2003). However,
the endogeneity problem now becomes striking: e.g. in the third wave of the WVS
(performed in years 95/96) the average response in Sweden was more "pro-free-
market" than in Australia or even in the United States. It is hard to believe that
this result does not re￿ ect the attitude of the Swedes to the existing scope of
their welfare state rather than their low support for more egalitarian outcomes in
general. To be clear, Guiso et al. (2003) look at individual data while controlling
for country ￿xed e⁄ects. With this di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach the presented
problem is less of an issue. However, here I instrument the average response in
countries, hence choosing such a proxy for beliefs would be very problematic. The
question about the source of personal success used in this paper minimizes this
kind of concerns, as it is an absolute and not a relative measure. In particular,
it asks about personal convictions in general and does not involve comparisons
16between the existing and the desirable.
Equally important is to ￿nd a proper measure of inequality within countries.
Until very recently, the majority of the papers in the ￿eld used the inequality
dataset compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996). This source represented a huge
improvement in terms of coverage and data quality and hence allowed for the
￿rst time the use of panel estimation in the inequality-growth context. However,
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) brought forward serious criticism regarding the
comparability of those data across countries and over time. I rely therefore on the
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) dataset recently created by James
K. Galbraith and associates.14 In particular, I use their Estimated Household
Income Inequality (EHII) data set which exploits the econometric relationship be-
tween UTIP-UNIDO data on industrial pay inequality and the extended Deininger-
Squire dataset while accounting for di⁄erent types of data sources (income versus
expenditure, household versus per capita, gross versus net).15 This approach yields
a consistent measure of inequality that allows for better comparability across space
and over time.
The measure for government interventions comes from the Government Size
Index by the Fraser Institute and captures government consumption, transfers
and subsidies, government enterprises and investment as well as top marginal tax
rates.16
The remaining variables come from the standard sources. Output and invest-
ment share are from the Penn World Table and educational attainment from the
Barro-Lee dataset. The religious data come from the Religion Adherence Data
Set by Robert Barro and comprise the percentage of population belonging to ￿ve
religious denominations - Catholics, Protestants, other Christians (e.g. Evangeli-
cals), Eastern religions (comprising Taoism and Confucianism among others) and
Hinduists/Buddhists.
5 Empirical Results
In this section I provide empirical evidence supporting the theoretical predictions
of the paper. First, I present the results of the ￿rst stage regression (equation 11).
14Another source of inequality data considered to be superior to the Deininger-Squire dataset
in terms of data quality and comparability is the Luxembourg Income Study dataset used e.g.
by Voitchovsky (2005). However, this database focuses mostly on developed OECD countries,
so the improved data quality comes at the cost of signi￿cantly reducing the sample size.
15For the dataset and further details on methodology see http://utip.gov.utexas.edu
16The original Government Size Index measures the magnitude of economic freedom with
higher values of index standing for less interventions of state in economy. I rescaled the index,
so that in this paper higher index values mean higher level of government interventions.
17These allow to divide countries according to their egalitarian or laissez-faire cul-
tural background. Next, I show evidence for the presence of mechanism underlying
my story. In particular, I demonstrate that negative correlation between changes
in state interventions on one side and inequality (and to a lesser extent growth) on
the other hand is stronger within egalitarian countries. Finally, I turn to reduced
form estimates, showing that the inequality-growth link tends to be more positive
in countries with an egalitarian cultural background.
The estimation results of (11) are reported in the Table 1 and con￿rm that
countries￿cultural background has signi￿cant impact on people￿ s economic be-
liefs. Higher proportions of mainstream Christians (Catholics and mainstream
Protestants) and disciples of Eastern religions (such as Taoism or Confucianism)
reinforce the egalitarian beliefs in a country. People in countries characterized by a
higher share of other Christians (e.g. Evangelicals) and Hinduists/Buddhists tend
to have more laissez-faire attitudes. Coe¢ cients for all religious groups are highly
signi￿cant and the overall F-statistics is 11.03. The adjusted R2 is above 31 per
cent. I use the estimated coe¢ cients to compute the instrumented value of beliefs
for every country. This value then serves to divide the sample into egalitarian and
laissez-faire countries. The culture dummy capturing an egalitarian background is
equal to one for countries whose instrumented value for beliefs is above median of
the sample. Table 2 provides more detail.
18Table 1: Cultural Content of Economic Beliefs
Dependent variable is the average belief in luck as main determinant of suc-
cess in life. mainchrist70, othchrist70, hin_bud70, easrel70 are the shares of
Mainstream Christians (Catholics and Protestants), other Christians, Hin-
duists and Buddhists and disciples of Eastern religions in the country￿ s pop-
ulation in the year 1970. Signi￿cance level (p value) derived from robust
















19Table 2: Egalitarian versus Laissez-Faire Cultural Background
of Countries
Country Instrumented Beliefs Culture Dummy
India 2.909976 0
South Africa 3.245476 0







Korea, Republic of 4.053463 0




United Kingdom 4.307251 0
Netherlands 4.329858 0






















20In the story underlying this paper governments vary the degree of state inter-
ventionism in order to meet the shifting demand for a socially acceptable level of
inequality driven by shocks to fairness parameter ￿. Simultaneously, the alter-
nation of government interventions a⁄ects economic performance as well. After
identifying the cultural background of countries, I examine whether the outlined
mechanism is stronger within the egalitarian countries. Tables 3 and 4 provide
support for this theoretical prediction by investigating the correlation patterns of
￿rst-di⁄erenced economic variables within countries.17
Table 3 shows that increases in state interventions are generally associated
with decreases in inequality and vice-versa. Importantly, the negative correlation
between changes in interventions and changes in inequality is stronger for the
group of egalitarian countries. The di⁄erence between mean correlations of the
two country groups is both quantitatively important and statistically signi￿cant
at 3 per cent level.
The evidence for a negative e⁄ect of an increase in government interventions
on economic performance is less clear-cut, but still present. Table 4 provides the
details. On the one hand, there is no link between changes in redistribution and
economic performance within laissez-faire countries. On the other hand, surges
in interventions are associated with decelerating economic growth within egali-
tarian countries.18 The di⁄erence between average correlations in both groups is
signi￿cant at 12 per cent level.
17Too few data points for a given country could generate spuriously high correlations close to
-1 or 1. To avoid this, only countries with at least 6 observations are considered when computing
within correlations in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. For that reason the number of all countries is lower
than in the growth regressions reported later.
18The table reports only the standard 95% con￿dence interval, but the mean correlation for
egalitarian countries becomes signi￿cantly negative at 6% level. Concretely, the 94% con￿dence
interval is (-0.295; -0.005).
21Table 3: Correlation of Changes in Inequality and Government
Interventions within Countries
Countries Mean Standard 95 % Con￿dence Interval
(Observations) (Std Error) Deviation
Laissez-Faire -0.233 0.342 (-0.430 ; -0.036)
(14) (0.091)
Egalitarian -0.519 0.279 (-0.696 ; -0.342)
(12) (0.081)
All Countries -0.365 0.341 (-0.503 ; -0.227)
(26) (0.067)
Di⁄erence 0.286 (0.030 ; 0.541)
(0.124)
Mean Comparison Test
t-Statistics t = 2.308
Signi￿cance Level 0.030
Table 4: Correlation of Changes in Growth and Government
Interventions within Countries
Countries Mean Standard 95 % Con￿dence Interval
(Observations) (Std Error) Deviation
Laissez-Faire 0.018 0.289 (-0.142 ; 0.178)
(15) (0.075)
Egalitarian -0.150 0.275 (-0.302 ; 0.002)
(15) (0.071)
All Countries -0.066 0.290 (-0.174 ; 0.0420)
(30) (0.053)
Di⁄erence 0.168 (-0.043 ; 0.379)
(0.103)
Mean Comparison Test
t-Statistics t = 1.632
Signi￿cance Level 0.114
22Finally I examine whether the relevance of countries￿cultural background can
still be detected in the reduced form relationship between inequality and growth.
Tables 3 and 4 a¢ rm that the culturally determined beliefs can alter the political
economy mechanism driving the within country dynamics between redistribution
on one side and inequality or growth on the other side. Given this evidence,
the reduced form estimates might reveal di⁄erent pattern of inequality-growth
relationship in egalitarian and laissez-faire countries. To see whether this is the
case, I run a series of growth panel data regressions based on (10) that control for
country ￿xed e⁄ects and thus capture the dynamics within countries.
Table 5 reports the results of three panel data regressions: the standard within
estimation, the system GMM estimation with a reduced number of instruments
and bias-corrected Least-Square Dummy Variables (LSDVC) estimation. The de-
pendent variable is the level of output. The independent variables are inequality
and the usual controls - the share of investment on GDP and the average number
of years of secondary schooling. Time dummies are included in all regressions.
The novelty is the inclusion of an interaction term between inequality and dummy
capturing economic beliefs. The dummy takes value one for egalitarian countries
and value zero for the laissez-faire ones.
The ￿rst column of Table 5 reports the results of a standard ￿xed e⁄ects esti-
mation. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term is positive and signi￿cant at 10%
level. This means that the positive correlation between variation in inequality and
growth is stronger within egalitarian countries. The di⁄erence is quantitatively im-
portant, as the point estimate for the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is almost
the double of the point estimate for the inequality coe¢ cient.
To account for the presence of lagged dependent variable among the regres-
sors and the potential endogeneity of other right-hand-side variables, I turn to the
GMM estimation developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and improved by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In other words, I employ
the system GMM estimation with a reduced set of instruments. As the focus of
the paper lies on the interplay between culture and inequality-growth dynamics, I
employ one lag of inequality and one lag of the inequality-culture interaction term
as instruments. Given the importance of the lagged dependent variable in this
framework, I also include a second lag of the output into the instrument set. The
results are shown in the second column of Table 5. The estimated coe¢ cient for
the interaction term is still positive, con￿rming a stronger positive co-movement
of inequality and growth within egalitarian countries. The signi￿cance level for
the interaction term slightly increases, despite the decrease in the point estimate.
The use of the system GMM thus leads to an improvement in the precision,
with which the di⁄erence between egalitarian and laissez-faire countries can be
estimated. The Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelations and the robust Sargan
23test are also satis￿ed. Moreover, over￿tting does not seem to be a problem with
the applied instrument set, as the p-value for the Sargan test is ￿rmly below 1.
The GMM system approach is also supposed to correct for downward bias on the
coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable present in other within estimations.
And indeed, the coe¢ cient on lagged output is now higher than in the ￿xed e⁄ects
estimation.
The last column reports the results for the LSDVC estimator. The stronger
co-movement of inequality and growth within egalitarian countries survives when
using this regression technique.
So far I classi￿ed every country as either egalitarian or laissez-faire. This binary
approach was motivated by two steady states derived in Alesina and Angeletos
(2005). In reality, countries￿cultural background can cover the whole range from
strictly laissez-faire to strongly egalitarian. As a robustness test I therefore test
whether the strength of egalitarian cultural background intensi￿es the positive co-
movement of inequality and growth within countries. I use the instrumented value
of peoples￿belief in "luck as a main source of success in life" from second column
of Table 2. This continuous variable is a proxy for the strength of the egalitarian
cultural background in a given country. Table 6 reports the results employing this
continuous cultural proxy. The speci￿cation and regression techniques (standard
￿xed e⁄ects estimation, system GMM, LSDVC) are the same as in Table 5, but
the inequality is now interacted with a continuous cultural variable rather than
with a culture dummy.
The results con￿rm that a stronger egalitarian cultural background generates
a starker co-movement of inequality and growth within countries. The interaction
term is always positive and with the exception of system GMM estimation also
signi￿cant. In the case of standard within (￿xed e⁄ects) estimation and LSDVC
estimation, the signi￿cance level is now higher than in the case of culture dummy.
The highly signi￿cant result in case of LSDVC regression is especially notewor-
thy, as this estimation approach is probably the most suitable for macroeconomic
dynamic panels with moderate cross-sectional dimension.
24Table 5: Presence of Egalitarian Cultural Background and
Inequality-Growth Dynamics
The dependent variable is the level of output. All regressions control for country and time
￿xed e⁄ects. The main variable of interest is (Inequality*Culture): the interaction term
between inequality and culture dummy from the third column of Table 3.2. The control
variables include level of inequality, output level at time t-1 (Lagged Output), average number
of years of secondary schooling (Education) and the share of investment in GDP (Investment).
Column (1) reports results of the standard ￿xed e⁄ects estimation, column (2) reports results
of system GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998) and column
(3) reports results of the bias-corrected Least-Squares Dummy Variables estimation (Kiviet
1995, Bruno 2005). Signi￿cance level (p value) derived from bootstrapped standard errors is
in square brackets.
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed E⁄ects System GMM LSDVC
Inequality 0.006 -0.002 0.008
[0.120] [0.677] [0.035]
Inequality*Culture 0.010 0.002 0.009
[0.100] [0.066] [0.072]
Lagged Output 0.726 0.829 0.820
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Education 0.026 0.024 0.021
[0.021] [0.146] [0.080]




Observations 260 260 260
Number of Countries 38 38 38
Arrelano-Bond Test for AR(1) 0.001
Arrelano-Bond Test for AR(2) 0.773
Sargan-Hansen Test (robust) 0.461
25Table 6: Intensity of Egalitarian Cultural Background and
Inequality-Growth Dynamics
The dependent variable is the level of output. All regressions control for country and time
￿xed e⁄ects. The main variable of interest is (Inequality*Culture): the interaction term
between inequality and the culturally determined component of people·s beliefs from the
second column of Table 3.2. The remaining variables are de￿ned in Table 3.5. Column (1)
reports results of the standard ￿xed e⁄ects estimation, column (2) reports results of system
GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998) and column (3) reports
results of the bias-corrected Least-Squares Dummy Variables estimation (Kiviet 1995, Bruno
2005). Signi￿cance level (p value) derived from bootstrapped standard errors is in square
brackets.
(1) (2) (3)
Fixed E⁄ects System GMM LSDVC
Inequality -0.038 -0.010 -0.036
[0.126] [0.129] [0.087]
Inequality*Culture 0.011 0.001 0.011
[0.064] [0.334] [0.022]
Lagged Output 0.728 0.873 0.817
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Education 0.287 0.007 0.028
[0.005] [0.663] [0.048]




Observations 260 260 260
Number of Countries 38 38 38
Arrelano-Bond Test for AR(1) 0.001
Arrelano-Bond Test for AR(2) 0.552
Sargan-Hansen Test (robust) 0.299
26The overall message from the reduced form regressions is that the internal
dynamics of inequality and economic performance di⁄ers between egalitarian and
laissez-faire countries. Speci￿cally, the two variables seem to be more positively
correlated within countries that for cultural reasons believe that luck and good
connections rather than hard work lead to personal success. Both the presence and
intensity of an egalitarian cultural background play an important role in shaping
the joint dynamics of real economic variables like inequality and growth within
countries over time.
6 Conclusion
This paper documents a stronger dynamic interplay between governmnet interven-
tions, inequality and growth in countries with an egalitarian cultural background.
The presented results suggest that one should be careful when inferring causality
from the positive inequality-growth link found in the within estimations without
accounting for possible cultural di⁄erences across countries. This re￿ ects a more
general problem in the literature. Cross-section and within estimation are all too
often regarded as alternative econometric techniques equally well designed to ad-
dress the same questions. However, the use of within estimation fundamentally
changes the economic interpretation of the regression results.19 This is especially
true if cultural factors a⁄ecting the internal political-economy process come into
play.
The paper also made a more general and arguably a more fundamental contri-
bution to the booming literature on culture and economics. The idea that cultural
factors have a strong impact on long-run economic outcomes has meanwhile gained
a broad acceptance in our profession. This paper examines a more subtle channel
through which culturally determined beliefs a⁄ect the economic reality. It shows
that a cultural background can shape the joint dynamics of economic variables
within countries over time. Here I focused on the relationship between govern-
ment interventions, inequality and growth. An interesting direction for a future
research could explore whether cultural factors shape the within-countries dynam-
ics of other economic variables as well.
19Durlauf et al. (2005) make this point in the context of ￿￿convergence. Their summary of
the discussion between Islam (1995,1998) and Lee et al. (1998) shows how switching between
di⁄erent estimation techniques substantially changes the economic interpretation of the empirical
results.
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30Appendix A: Impact of Redistribution on Inequality and Growth
This appendix documents a negative correlation between redistribution and
inequality as well as between redistribution and economic growth within the the-
oretical framewok of Alesina and Angeletos.
One can show - building upon the derivation from the technical appendix of
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) - that for a stationary history (￿s = ￿ for all previous
generations s ￿ t ￿ 1) wealth in period t is given by:
wit = (1 ￿ ￿t)
2￿i + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿i + (1 ￿ ￿t)￿[
1
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
((1 ￿ ￿)
2￿i + (1 ￿ ￿)￿i + G)] + Gt
= f(1 ￿ ￿t)
2 + (1 ￿ ￿t)
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)
2g￿i +
+f(1 ￿ ￿t) + (1 ￿ ￿t)
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)g￿i + (1 ￿ ￿t)
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
G + Gt
The variance of wealth, which gives a natural measure of inequality in this
model is thus given by:
V ar(wit) = f(1 ￿ ￿t)
2 +
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)





+f(1 ￿ ￿t) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)




= f(1 ￿ ￿t)
2 +
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)













which is obviously decreasing in ￿t.
Now we turn to the relation between redistribution and economic growth. Eval-
uating the pre-tax wealth (equation 1) at the optimum yields:
yit = Ait[(1 ￿ ￿t)Ait￿it] + ￿it + ￿wit￿1
= (1 ￿ ￿t)￿it + ￿it + ￿wit￿1
31Aggregating output across all agents gives
Z
i
yit = (1 ￿ ￿t)
Z
i




yt = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t + ￿wt￿1
The fact that the state has a purely redistributive role (no public goods) and
there is no waste in redistribution (see equation 2) implies equality between pre-tax
and disposable wealth of the average agent:
y = w
Combining the last two expressions ￿nally yields:
yt = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t + ￿yt￿1
￿yt = (1 ￿ ￿t)￿t + (￿ ￿ 1)yt￿1
where ￿yt ￿ yt ￿ yt￿1
Besides the standard convergence e⁄ect (￿ ￿ 1 < 0) economic growth is also
decreasing in the level of redistribution ￿t.
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